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CHAPTER 21
COURTS AND EXECUTIVES
JEFFREY L. YATES AND SCOTT BODDERY
William Howard Taft was both our twenty-seventh president and the tenth Chief 
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court—the only person to have ever held both high posi­
tions in our country. He once famously commented that “presidents may come and 
go, but the Supreme Court goes on forever” (Pringle 1998). His remark reminds us that 
presidents serve only four-year terms (and are now limited to two of them), but justices 
of the Supreme Court are appointed for life and leave a legacy of precedent-setting cases 
after departing the High Court. Of course, presidents also leave a legacy of important 
decisions, not the least of which being their appointment of federal judges.
Just as presidents cast an influence on the federal judiciary and the direction of 
American legal policy-making through judicial appointment (and other means), fed­
eral judges help shape the Constitutional parameters and contours of the executive 
branch, as well as its powers and policies, through their jurisprudence. From the High 
Courts rebuke of president Harry Truman’s assertion of executive power in the Steel 
Seizure Case to President Barack Obamas “calling out” the Supreme Court regarding 
the Citizens’ United ruling on the First Amendment rights of corporations—the rela­
tionship and interactions between the two primary institutions are important, at times 
volatile, and always intriguing.
Although executive-courts phenomena lend themselves well to empirical investiga­
tion and scholarship they are perhaps understudied relative to other topics in American 
politics and law. This is unfortunate as these interactions and related policy outcomes 
provide fruitful lines of inquiry for scholars interested in the dynamics of American 
government and law.
In this chapter we examine and analyze empirical studies addressing the intersec­
tion of courts and executives and explore multiple aspects of the dynamics and nuances 
involved in direct and indirect interactions between these two federal branches. In the 
section that follows we explore the literature on the formal powers of the president and 
how courts have shaped and adjusted the legal authority and reach of the president. We 
further investigate how executives can influence legal policy through less direct path­
ways such as agenda-setting. In the next section we consider how presidents have helped 
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shape the landscape of American law through the appointment of judicial actors and the 
politics of the federal judicial selection process. Finally, we address the presidents legal 
arm—the Solicitor General’s Office—and investigate the offices influence on Supreme 
Court policy-making.1
Defining the Executive: Courts
on the Formal Powers of the President
The Constitutional foundations of the executive and judicial branches are not set forth 
in a tremendous amount of detail. Time and practice have helped inform our under­
standing of the relationship. Although the judiciary was originally considered the ‘least 
dangerous branch’ that wielded ‘neither the purse nor the sword’ (Hamilton 1788), the 
power dynamics between the executive and the judicial branch have emerged over 
time as more balanced and nuanced than these early assertions might have portended. 
Prominent in most scholars’ minds is Chief Justice John Marshal’s positioning of the 
Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison 
(1803) through his jousting with President Thomas Jefferson. Knight and Epstein (1996) 
explain that the confrontation between Jefferson and Marshal highlight well the fluid 
and incremental process whereby democracy is institutionalized. They further note:
The major long-term consequence of the Jefferson-Marshall interaction was a 
restructuring of the institutional division of labor among the branches ... The 
Supreme Court’s authority for judicial review emerged, not because of some complex 
intentional design and not because of some brilliant strategic move by Marshall in 
the face of overwhelming political opposition, but merely because it was politically 
viable at the time. The lesson for contemporary efforts to institutionalize democracy 
through constitutional design is that such efforts are merely the first, and tentative, 
steps in an ongoing political game.
(1996:113-14)
Certainly Marbury helped solidify judicial review power for the Court, but legal insti­
tutions remain dependent on executive branch actors to implement and bring to pol­
icy fruition their legal edicts. This fact makes direct interactions between courts and 
executives—in which courts rule on the powers of the executive—especially intriguing. 
The somewhat uncomfortable nature of this situation is highlighted by the situation the 
High Court faced in U.S. v. Nixon in which, during oral arguments before the justices, 
President Nixon’s counsel vacillated when directly asked if the executive would comply 
with an order from the Court (to turn over information). In an interview years later, 
former justice Lewis Powell noted, “one has to wonder what would have happened if 
Nixon had said what President Jackson said on one occasion, ‘You have your decree, 
now enforce it.’ We had 50 ‘police’ officers, but Nixon had the First Infantry Division” 
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(Powell 1995:173). Of course, Nixon did in fact follow the Court’s ruling and such a con­
frontation was ultimately avoided.
Assessments of the appropriate scope and reach of presidential power and action have 
varied considerably, even among those who have held the position. William Howard 
Taft’s view of the executive role was one of constraint. He opined:
The true view of executive functions... is, as I conceive it, that the President can exer­
cise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to some specific grant of 
power or jusdy implied and included within such grant as proper and necessary.
(Biskupic and Witt 1997:169)
On the other end of the spectrum rests the view of Theodore Roosevelt that the execu­
tive stands as an active steward of the public well-being and, as such, must be free to have 
far-reaching powers. He argued that:
Every executive officer ... was a steward of the people ... My belief was that it was 
not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the nation demanded 
unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws ... In other 
words, I acted for the public welfare ... whenever and in whatever manner was nec­
essary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative provision.
(1997:170)
Judicial assessments of the parameters of presidential power have led to productive 
lines of research. Early treatments of the limits of executive authority focused on formal 
Constitutional provisions and Court opinions on the reach of the executive with the 
general consensus being that the president has fared well over time and has generally 
been afforded greater deference in foreign policy and defense matters relative to domes­
tic policy concerns (e.g. Corwin 1984; Rossiter 1951; Schubert 1957; Scigliano 1971). As 
the study of both the presidency and the judiciary progressed, scholars endeavored to 
provide more social-science-oriented approaches to assaying courts’ treatment of the 
limits of executive power.
In 1989 Ducat and Dudley’s seminal study on the topic systematically examined fed­
eral district court cases pertaining to core aspects of presidential legal concerns—the 
lawful reach of executive power and relevant limits. In assessing the decisions of district 
court judges they found that there were indeed “two presidencies” in executive power 
jurisprudence—consistent with Aaron Wildavsky’s (1966) broader thesis on the U.S. 
presidency and Justice Sutherland’s majority opinion analysis of the domestic-foreign 
policy contextual aspects of the law of presidential power in United States v. Curtis- 
Wright Export Corp. (1936).
Ducat and Dudley found that in cases involving foreign policy the executive was 
afforded much more deference by district court judges than in domestic policy cases. 
In break out analyses, they found that theoretically interesting political factors such as 
a presidents’ prestige (public approval levels), whether a judge was appointed by the 
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president whose powers were at issue, and the specific type of power involved helped to 
explain executive success in domestic cases, but that none of these considerations mat­
tered in foreign policy litigation outcomes before the district courts. Regarding this dis­
tinction, Ducat and Dudley concluded that “presidential leadership on the home front 
depends upon his persuasive power backed by his public prestige. In this area, district 
court judges have not acted much differently from other officeholders with whom the 
president deals” (1989:116).
Their study design was later extended to U.S. Supreme Court justice voting by Yates 
and Whitford (1998) who advanced alternative measurement and specification strat­
egies. Their study confirmed Ducat and Dudleys primary finding that the president is 
afforded more deference in foreign policy presidential power cases (but cf. King and 
Meernik 1999; Clark 2006) and they also found that justices’ votes were influenced by 
justices’ ideological preferences and upward trends in presidents’ public approval. More 
recently, Robinson (2012) examined High Court justices’ votes in an updated data set of 
presidential power cases and found that justices’ background socialization, more specifi­
cally justice executive branch experience and the length of that experience, were associ­
ated with voting outcomes that favor deference to the president when core powers are 
at issue.
Certainly, differences of opinion exist on the proper scope and limits of executive power. 
Construction of a doctrinal matrix that makes sense of courts’ jurisprudence on presiden­
tial power has been a popular scholarly endeavor (e.g. Chemerinsky 1983), but perhaps one 
that appropriately considers historical and political context rather than strictly legal con­
siderations. In the section that follows, we turn our attentions to executive-court interac­
tions that have less to do with addressing the formal powers of office and more to do with 
battles over policy and the direction of U.S. governance and policy-making.
The “Less Formal” Powers: Inter­
Branch Deference, Persuasion, 
and Potential Threat
The executive and judiciary have multiple pathways of interaction, but one of the more 
interesting occurs when the executive’s bureaucratic arm—the federal agencies—appear 
before the courts, most notably, before the U.S. Supreme Court. The federal bureau­
cracy provides the president with one of the most effective means of implementing their 
desired policy changes since most legislation affords a good degree of implementation 
discretion by the agencies. Further, policy scholars argue that federal agencies have 
become more “politicized” over time as executives are held accountable by the public, 
yet sometimes find their policy goals thwarted by Congress. In contrast, the federal 
agencies provide perhaps a more receptive avenue for effecting the type of change on 
which executives will stake their re-election and legacy aspirations (e.g. Moe 1991). The 
acknowledged proposition that presidents attempt to make their policy mark through 
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agencies is outlined well in one of the Court’s opinions, authored by Justice William 
Rehnquist:
The agencies’ changed view of the standard seems to be related to the election of a 
new President of a different political party ... A change in administration brought 
about by people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive 
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regulations.
(Motor Vehicle Manufacturing Association v. State Farm Mutual 
Insurance, 463 U.S. 59 (1983))
Of course, the courts are responsible for reviewing agency action and thus presidents 
must deal with judicial monitoring of their policy implementation agents. Federal agency 
litigation in the Supreme Court has long been a topic of interest to judicial politics schol­
ars, with most studies finding that they fare pretty well, overall. Traditional social science 
accounts of the federal agency experience before the High Court often focused on the 
type of agency involved—social versus economic—with the thesis being that social agen­
cies handled more salient or volatile concerns and were likely to fare worse.
Sheehan (1990) argued persuasively that this distinction was not as important as 
the ideological direction of the agency’s position relative to the ideology of the Court. 
In follow-up work he found that the distinction between independent and executive 
agency mattered, with independent agencies—often quasi-judicial in character and typ­
ically more removed from executive politics—winning more before the Court (Sheehan 
1992). However, he again found that the biggest driver of agency success in such liti­
gation was ideology—when agencies (executive or independent) were bringing cases 
that were antagonistic to the Court’s aggregate policy preferences, they fared worse. 
Yates (1999) added a nuance to this thesis, finding that justices’ votes on agencies that 
were more proximate to the president (cabinet-level agencies vs. independent agencies) 
were conditioned on presidential public standing (i.e., public approval). Justices’ votes 
on agencies were also found to be influenced by the type of subject matter they dealt 
with—agencies charged with foreign policy concerns fared better than those whose 
work focused on domestic matters.
Finally, Richards, Smith, and Kritzer (2006) added an interesting wrinkle to the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of federal agencies story by evaluating the impact of juris­
prudent regimes on agency Court outcomes. Specifically, they were interested in the 
effect of the Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A, v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. 
et al. (467 U.S. 865 (1984)) on justices’ subsequent voting in agency cases. In Chevron, the 
Court addressed the issue of what should be the proper amount of deference that courts 
should afford to the statutory interpretations of federal agencies. The majority opinion, 
authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, set forth the Court’s standard for doing so in the 
absence of clear congressional intent:
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the stat­
ute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, 
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if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for 
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.
(467 U.S. 842-3)
Richards et al. found that even though judicial ideology or attitudes still did much to 
explain justice voting, the Court’s adjustment in legal regime (standard of review) on 
agency cases has a substantively interesting effect on justices’ propensity to afford def­
erence to agencies. Moreover, consistent with the Chevron holding, this deference was 
constrained in cases in which Congress’s intent was more clear and in cases dealing with 
rule-making (hence involving higher stakes) (2006:456-62).
Another important dynamic in U.S. Supreme Court-executive relations is issue 
attention and agenda-setting. Executive branch influence on Supreme Court case selec­
tion is addressed in our discussion on the Solicitor General, but here we are interested in 
broader-level matters regarding issue attention and problem-solving focus. Those who 
study governance have appropriately acknowledged the centrality of problem and issue 
attention and agenda-setting for policy-making. Institutions identify and pursue issues, 
or social/economic problems and engage in complex cue-taking relationships.
The Supreme Court’s issue agenda has long been a topic of interest for legal and social 
science scholars. As Pacelie (1991), Perry (1991), and others have noted, the High Court’s 
selection of issues to adjudicate from the thousands of petitions for certiorari it receives 
is one of the most important decisions that it makes. Of course, the president’s time, 
resources, and political capital to expend on issues is also finite and involves opportu­
nity costs. Executive or Supreme Court identification and recognition of a social or eco­
nomic concern gives it public validation and promotion as an important matter that all 
political actors must either address or risk becoming less relevant in the arena of public 
debate. How these two primary institutions come to choose what broad issues and prob­
lems to focus their attentions on has been a recurring research question (e.g. Caldeira 
1981; Pacelie 1991; Cohen 1997; Hill 1998; Flemming, Wood, and Bohte 1997; Edwards 
and Wood 1999; Yates, Whitford, and Gillespie 2005). Studies testing whether these two 
branches of the federal government actually influence each other’s issue attentions have 
been more rare.
Whether primary federal institutions (president, Congress, and Supreme Court) and 
the general public (systemic) are related and affect one another was the central question 
addressed by Flemming, Wood, and Bohte (1997). They employed vector autoregression 
methods to assess macrodynamic shifts in attention to policy issues. Their areas of inter­
est were civil rights, civil liberties, and environmental issues. They found that the Court’s 
focus on civil rights and civil liberties influenced the executive’s attention to those policy 
matters, but that there was no such effect with regard to environmental concerns. In con­
trast, they found that presidential attention to all three policy issues had no influence on 
Court attentions. Presidents’ issue attentions were also affected by Congress (civil liberties 
and environmental) and system (public) emphasis (environmental) whereas Court issue 
priorities were influenced by Congress’ (civil liberties and civil rights) issue attention.
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Later work has found that High Court attentions (to criminal justice policy issues) 
is influenced by expressed presidential issue emphasis (Yates, Whitford, and Gillespie 
2005) and that executive issue priorities are influenced by Court issue agenda signaling 
(Yates and Whitford 2005). Certainly, future research might explore the stream of issues 
that compete for the attentions of government institutions and the public and media 
stage. As social media becomes increasingly pervasive, the battle over what public con­
cerns gain the eyes and ears of public leaders becomes more complex and perhaps is 
influenced not only by the relevant actors and institutions themselves, but also by the 
manner in which communication takes place.
Finally, a river of scholarly research has explored the possibility that political institu­
tions and their actors operate in a sophisticated, forward-thinking manner, in that they 
anticipate the potentially threatening or contrarian reactions of other relevant policy 
actors and adjust their policy decisions accordingly. Of course, two of those political 
institutions (and their policy-making actors) are the judicial and executive branches. 
Studies exploring this rational choice approach to explaining institutional political 
phenomena are plentiful and typically consider the executive and judiciary as part of a 
larger game that also includes Congress and the public (e.g. Eskridge 1991; Epstein and 
Knight 1998; Segal 1997; Martin 2001; Curry, Pacelle, and Marshall 2008; Lindquist and 
Corley 2011).
However, Baum (2006) asserts that, on balance, the empirical findings of these stud­
ies supporting the existence of such strategic actions are decidedly mixed. He further 
argues convincingly that parsing such effects from alternative judicial motivations can 
be problematic and that there are theoretical and pragmatic concerns with the proposi­
tion of systemic threat driving judges’ decisions. Still, he leaves the door open to the 
possibility of such strategic action by judges, noting: “Undoubtedly some judges at some 
times act on their fear of negative consequences from displeasing other branches. Yet 
their incentives to take this course are limited in important respects, and by no means 
do judges automatically bend under pressure. Action to avoid or defuse conflict with 
other branches is episodic, and it may be exceptional as well” (2006: 81). Baum’s con­
cerns about the viability of a systemic impact on judicial actions are noteworthy, how­
ever Epstein and Knight (1998) and others have made a convincing case that Supreme 
Court justices at least consider and discuss (with each other) the potential reactions of 
other branches to Court action on occasion.
There also exists the possibility that presidents are influenced by either the persua­
sion or potential threat of judges. Certainly executives react to judicial action and, in 
fact, use the “bully pulpit” regularly to discuss judicial matters. Perhaps the most memo­
rable instance of this in recent years was President Obama’s state of the union rebuke of 
the High Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. But how 
often does the executive actually address such matters in public rhetoric? Blackstone 
and Goelzhauser (2014) explore presidential rhetoric regarding the U.S. Supreme Court. 
They analyze such rhetoric from 1929 to 2011 and find that presidents delivered over 
six-thousand sentences concerning the High Court during that time, for an average 
of seventy-four sentences a year. Presidents’ gave an average of twenty-three positive 
406 JEFFREY L. YATES AND SCOTT BODDERY
statements regarding the Court per year and thirty-eight negative statements (critical of 
the Court or its actions) with the balance being described as neutral.
Thus, we can at least surmise that presidents pay relatively close attention to the Court 
and its dealings and regularly expend valuable public-speaking time discussing it. But 
executive branch action is often employed through agency action and the Court reg­
ularly rules on such actions. Hence, scholars studying the intersection of Court juris­
prudence and presidential policy implementation make a strong argument that the 
Supreme Court (and lower courts) wield a viable tool in influencing the course of execu­
tive branch governance through judicial decisions. For example, Spriggs (1996) finds 
that federal agencies did adjust their policy-making in response to decisions made by 
the Court, but that the degree to which they adjusted their actions was influenced by the 
specificity of the Court’s majority opinion, among other important considerations.
The Power of Appointment—Can 
Presidents Mold the Judiciary?
In announcing his 2009 appointment of now associate justice Sonia Sotomayor, 
President Obama began his public statement by observing “of the many responsibili­
ties granted to a president by our Constitution, few are more serious or more conse­
quential than selecting a Supreme Court justice. The members of our highest court are 
granted life tenure, often serving long after the presidents who appointed them.”2 His 
remark outlines well the profound policy implications of presidential Court appoint­
ments. Historically, such presidential appointments have reflected a mix of personal and 
professional motivations by the executive as well as concerns over the reality of the ideo­
logical politics surrounding such important decisions (Epstein and Segal 2005).
Of course, such appointments must pass the gauntlet of Senate confirmation, but the 
power of appointment provides presidents with the opportunity to potentially make 
substantively significant inroads on the character of policy-making within the judi­
cial branch of government. In this section we first examine the politics of U.S. Supreme 
Court selection and how presidential appointment decisions may impact the High 
Court’s policy-making. We then turn to the lower federal courts, exploring the dynam­
ics of staffing the nation’s federal district and intermediate appellate courts and the pol­
icy implications of these choices. Finally, we consider diversity and policy outcomes that 
have resulted in the lower courts through presidential appointment decisions.
The federal Constitution’s provisions regarding how Supreme Court justices are 
selected underwent a number of revisions and were the topic of much debate by the 
Founders. While some favored a legislatively driven selection mechanism, others pre­
ferred one tilted toward the executive—and in the end they settled on the Article II 
(section 2) language granting the president the power to nominate and, “by and with 
the advice of the Senate” to appoint “judges of the Supreme Court.” Though the role of 
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the Senate and the appropriate bases for confirmation decisions have been a subject of 
debate, the executive has largely been successful in getting nominees confirmed for the 
nations High Court.
To consider the first step of this process (nomination choice), we turn to Moraski and 
Shipan’s (1999) oft-cited study on the dynamics of executive nominations to the High 
Court. They explored nominations to the Court from 1949 to 1994 and postulated that 
presidents acted in a forward-thinking, strategic manner in choosing who to nominate. 
Their empirical findings revealed that presidents were cognizant of the relative pref­
erences and ideological character of both the Senate and continuing members of the 
Court and that in certain contexts their nomination choices were influenced by these 
considerations. Thus, political concerns cast an influence on who ultimately ascends the 
Court before a single confirmation vote is cast in the Senate.
Once a president has nominated a potential justice for the Court, they often engage 
in the process of “selling” their choice to both the Senate and the public. Maltese (1995) 
maintains that the “selling” of Supreme Court nominees has changed over time as 
modern presidents increasingly “go public” with their preferred judicial candidates, as 
opposed to earlier executives. He notes, “for many years presidents felt that it was inap­
propriate to comment publicly on their Supreme Court nominees. To do so would be to 
stoop to ‘politics’ in a process that was supposed to be untainted by political consider­
ations” (1995:447). He argues that the executives increased willingness to speak publicly 
about their candidates is likely part of a broader “public presidency” phenomenon. It 
also likely reflects the increasing attention that politicians pay to media concerns and 
public sentiment.
Taking this line of reasoning a step further, Johnson and Roberts (2004) explored the 
determinants of presidential “selling” of Supreme Court nominees via public rhetoric. 
They analyze the content of presidential statements on nominees from 1949 to 1994 and 
focus on three primary types of statements: 1) those espousing the nominees qualifica­
tions, 2) those claiming that the public favors the nominee, and 3) those encouraging 
the Senate to act fairly and quickly. As might be expected, most of the presidents public 
comments concerned promoting the nominees qualities and qualifications (followed by 
statements pressuring the Senate and then claims regarding public opinion). They found 
that ideological conflict with the Senate (distance between nominee and Senate filibus­
ter pivot; distance between Court median and filibuster pivot; and distance between 
president and filibuster pivot) led to increased rhetoric on nominees by presidents. Such 
rhetoric was also influenced by the presidents relative public prestige (popular presi­
dents were less likely to go public), nomination timing, and Senate delay on confirma­
tion. But did these executive appeals to the public have an effect on Senate confirmation 
outcomes? Johnson and Roberts found that presidents’ rhetorical efforts did in fact have 
a payoff as such statements cast a meaningful influence on senators’ votes on Supreme 
Court nominees.
It is likely that executives’ public campaigns for High Court candidates are here to 
stay, as such battles over nominations increasingly end up getting played out in the 
media and social forums. Of course, the success of presidents’ nominees before the 
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Senate can turn on a number of executive-oriented factors, beyond presidential rheto­
ric. For instance, even though presidents with high public approval are by no means 
assured of Senate success, their nominees do, on average, fare better before the Senate 
than those of less popular presidents (Epstein and Segal 2005: 108). Future research 
might do well to consider the relevant political context and presidents’ personal moti­
vations in such nomination/confirmation scenarios. For example, presidents who have 
previously experienced a failed or divisive nomination may be more apt to make conces­
sions on their next appointment attempt. In similar vein, Senate confirmations may be 
less salient and accordingly less volatile in times in which media and public attention 
are drawn to other compelling political or social events that compete with confirmation 
hearings for social agenda space.
The attention and tumult over Supreme Court selection leads many to wonder what 
impact, if any, such personnel decisions have on U.S. legal policy. Do executives leave a 
lasting policy legacy through their Supreme Court appointments? Historical accounts 
provide anecdotal evidence of executive policy success as well as some presidents’ bit­
ter disappointments in their appointees (Epstein and Segal 2005). Gates and Cohen 
(1988) found that presidents generally enjoyed policy agreement with the justices they 
appointed in the area of racial equality cases. In a subsequent study, Segal, Timpone, 
and Howard (2000) assayed this general premise, examining presidents’ appointments 
to the Court from 1937 to 1994. They were not only concerned with overall president­
appointee policy agreement, but whether such agreement fluctuated over time—the 
idea being that justices’ policy druthers might approximate their appointing presidents’ 
preferences early on, but then “drifted” over time. Using a measure of presidential ideol­
ogy derived from a survey of political scientists, they find general concordance between 
presidents and their appointed justices in civil liberties and economic cases. However, 
such agreement disintegrated over time, with executive-justice concordance dissipating 
after the first four years of justice tenure on the High Court in civil liberties cases and 
after ten years of judicial service in economic cases.
Krehbiel (2007) argued that presidents could make significant policy gains through 
Supreme Court appointments, but his empirical findings suggested that the political 
circumstances necessary to effectuate such an impactful judicial appointment rarely 
presented themselves. In a more recent study Epstein, Landes, and Posner found that 
Supreme Court justices exhibited substantial “ideological divergence” from their 
appointing presidents over time, with these effects being mitigated by executives’ choice 
of justices who had prior government service. They found similar ideological divergence 
effects concerning executive nominations to the U.S. Courts of Appeals (2013:119-22). 
Given that average life spans are increasing and many justices serve as long as health 
permits, this drifting of justices’ voting (from presumed orientation during appoint­
ment and confirmation) has caused some to question the democratic nature of High 
Court policy-making as the electoral connection becomes more tenuous (Sharma and 
Glennon 2013).
High Court judicial selections garner plentiful media attention and can provide high 
political drama. However, it is arguably the case that greater cumulative policy inroads 
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are made by presidents through their lower federal court appointments. Presidents’ 
may not experience the level of scrutiny on these nominations as they do with regard 
to the High Court, however political dynamics still persist in lower court selections. 
Consternation over executive nominations and delay in confirmations of lower fed­
eral court judges have increased in recent decades (Scherer 2005). Presidents appear 
to be ready, willing, and able to bring the bully pulpit to bear in promoting such lower 
court nominations. Holmes (2008) finds that presidents have increasingly gone public 
on behalf of their lower court nominees over time and explains that this trend may be 
part of a strategy aimed at elite interests rather than simply securing the confirmation of 
nominees. She notes:
The context of these references does not always appear to be aimed toward shifting 
mass public attitude toward a nominee or securing confirmation for that specific 
individual. Rather, presidents often utilize these nominees in public discourse to 
achieve other goals, including appealing to organized groups, women and minori­
ties, or partisan campaign supporters.
(2008:119-20)
One aspect of the lower court selection process that is less relevant for the Supreme 
Court (at least since President Eisenhower) has been executive use of recess appoint­
ments to place jurists on the federal bench. Graves and Howard (2010) examine all 
judicial appointments made during Senate recess from 1789 to 2004. They find that 
presidents’ use of recess appointments has declined substantially since the adminis­
tration of President Kennedy as Senate recesses have grown shorter. Further, pres­
idents use such appointments in a political strategic fashion and active presidents 
are more apt to take advantage of recess opportunities for appointment (2010: 650). 
Finally, there is also some evidence to suggest that presidents act strategically in 
their nomination of lower court judges—carefully timing their nominations (rela­
tive to the date of vacancy) in order to facilitate a nominee-friendly confirmation 
environment—with certain institutional constraints, of course (Massie, Hansford, 
and Songer 2004).
Appointments to the lower federal courts provide presidents with substantial oppor­
tunities to influence the law as trial and intermediate appellate courts represent the final 
disposition for the vast majority of litigated matters. But, are those opportunities actu­
ally realized in lower court policy-making? Rowland, Songer, and Carp (1988) examined 
the policy-making of the nominees of presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Carter in criminal 
justice cases. They found important differences among the appointed justices, both in 
the federal district courts and in the courts of appeals, with Reagan’s judges deciding 
cases significantly more conservatively than Carter’s judges (with Nixon falling between 
the two). Goldman (1997) suggests that presidents have competing goals in appoint­
ing lower court judges, with some presidents focusing on partisan considerations (e.g., 
gaining political capital) as others were primarily interested in shaping the ideological 
contours of the federal judiciary.
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Certainly, some executives were mainly interested in advancing personal goals (e.g., 
increasing gender and racial diversity). A host of studies have addressed the latter prop­
osition regarding diversity.3 Kimel and Randazzo (2012) assay the appointment pro­
pensities of recent presidential administrations (William Clinton, George W. Bush, and 
Barack Obama) and address how these presidents’ nomination policies have impacted 
diversity in the federal lower courts. They find that Obama nominated more minori­
ties for the bench (35 percent) than Clinton (24 percent) or Bush (17 percent) as well as 
the most female jurists (46 percent, with Clinton at 29 percent and Bush at 22 percent). 
Examining a subset of nominees for which ideological scores were available, they find 
that Obamas nominees were more moderate than either the Bush or Clinton nominees 
scores—suggesting that Obama pursued a rather pragmatic approach to diversifying 
the federal lower courts. All three presidents enjoyed fairly high levels of confirmations 
success for their nominations, with Clinton being the most successful overall (81 per­
cent confirmed), followed by Bush (78 percent) and Obama (74 percent). Finally, Collins 
(2009,2010) demonstrates that presidents can significantly change the partisan makeup 
of the U.S. Courts of Appeals through appointment, and, accordingly, the policy-making 
jurisprudence of the intermediate court.
The President’s Lawyer—the Supreme
Court and the Solicitor General
We would certainly be remiss if we did not discuss the storied relationship between the 
High Court and the presidents legal arm, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). 
The OSG is a creature of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1870 which created both the 
Department of Justice and the OSG. This act came in response to a burgeoning work­
load that had been heaped upon the Attorney General as the nation and its legal issues 
expanded and other attempts to solve the workload issue had proven problematic (Black 
and Owens 2012:11-14). The OSG is the primary legal advocate for the executive branch 
and U.S. government before the Supreme Court. Its duties with regard to the nations 
High Court include, among others: a) the selection of cases for petitioning for certio­
rari (when the United States is a direct litigant); b) representing the United States on 
the merits of the case (again, when the United States is a direct litigant); c) drafting and 
filing amicus curiae when the government is an interested party; d) authorizing other 
interested actors to submit amicus curiae briefs (when the United States is a direct liti­
gant) (Salokar 1992).
To say that the OSG occupies a curious place in U.S. law and politics would be an 
understatement. The Court relies on the OSG to provide reliable and informative views 
(e.g., submission of amicus curiae briefs). At the same time, the Solicitor General (SG) 
is an executive appointee and even though SGs can and do depart from presidents’ pol­
icy views in their role, studies typically find a congruence between the OSG’s positions 
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and executives’ preferences, as we might intuitively surmise (e.g. Yates 2002; Black and 
Owens 2012). On this “dual identity” dynamic, President Ronald Reagans SG, Rex Lee, 
commented that:
On the one hand, I am a presidential appointee, a part of the presidents team. I very 
much believe in the president’s program and I want to do what I can to help advance it... 
On the other hand, I am also an officer of the Court. And the relationship between the 
solicitor general and the Supreme Court is one that knows no counterpart.
(Witt 1986:120)
Lee’s comment prompts the question of whether the OSG carries special influence with 
the Court. A number of rationales for such possible influence have been posited— 
deference to the executive branch; reputation and credibility that have been developed 
over time; and resource advantages, to name a few. Undoubtedly, the OSG has had tre­
mendous success before the Court along multiple dimensions—certiorari petition out­
comes, on the merits outcomes, and amicus activity—as a bevy of studies on the matter 
have confirmed (e.g. Caplan 1987; Salokar 1992; Segal 1990; Zorn 2002; Pacelie 2003; 
Black and Owens 2012). But does this success necessarily demonstrate that the OSG car­
ries any special influence or sway with the nation’s High Court? Are there perhaps other 
considerations that may lead to its success?
One consideration is legal experience. McGuire (1998) makes a convincing argument 
that much of the SG’s success in the U.S. Supreme Court is due to differential levels of 
experience in litigating cases before the High Court—-the SG has, in the typical situation, 
more experience than opposing counsel—and accordingly, wins more often. In similar 
fashion, Zorn (2002) makes the case that the SG’s success before the Court can be par­
tially attributed to the OSG’s meticulous and strategic selection of the cases it chooses to 
argue before the Court (from the relatively large pool of cases that could be pursued). On 
the other hand, Black and Owens (2012) use a case-matching strategy to assess SG for­
tunes before the Court that takes into account some of these considerations (e.g., attor­
ney experience) and conclude that the SG does carry unique influence with the Court 
across a number of dimensions. They reason that the credibility of the OSG as an infor­
mative, reliable, and principled officer of the Court is key to this relationship. Wohlfarth’s 
(2009) study provides some support for this proposition. He finds that the SG wins less 
before the Court when its litigation efforts become more politicized. Suffice it to say, these 
research efforts are certainly not the end of this debate and scholars will certainly con­
tinue to investigate the roots of the OSG’s success with the nation’s High Court.
As presidents continue to push the parameters of presidential power in an attempt 
to appease the sometimes unreasonable demands of the citizenry to promote the pub­
lic well-being, interactions with courts will likely increase—both in number and in 
salience. The U.S. Supreme Court is also increasingly perceived by the public as a politi­
cal, rather than purely policy-neutral, institution. Thus, matters such as presidential 
judicial appointments and the OSG’s activities before the High Court will likely find 
themselves more and more as the media’s top news stories.
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With this in mind, the dynamics between executives and courts bring to bear some 
of the fundamental questions of our Constitutional tradition—what is the place of each 
of these institutions in guiding the direction of U.S. life? To what degree does each pro­
vide a meaningful check on congressional power in the policy arena? And what hap­
pens regarding policy enforcement when the president and the Court strongly disagree? 
These questions and others offer rich opportunities for further scholarship as we strive 
to better understand how U.S. political power is shared and policy made.
Notes
1. We focus here on studies involving the interplay between the American president and the 
federal courts (primarily the U.S. Supreme Court). We acknowledge that an intriguing, but 
relatively limited, literature addresses interactions between state executives and courts (e.g. 
Schorpp 2012; Johnson 2014).
2. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-in-Nominating- 
Judge-Sonia-Sotomayor-to-the-United-States-Supreme-Court .
3. Kimel and Randazzo (2012) provide a useful review of the many studies commenting on 
political concerns that may influence the development of diversity on the federal bench.
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